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ROBERT 0. FREEMAN*

Possible Solutions to the
200-Mile Territorial Limitt
The law of the sea boasts no more important current topic than the
question of the manner in which the resources of the sea are to be exploited by the nations of the international community.' Because the resources of the sea are not unlimited, there is an ever-increasing need for
international cooperation with respect to their exploitation. Directly in the
path toward such international cooperation stands the record of recent
attempts by some nations to assert control unilaterally over the exploitation of the resources of the sea within maritime zones contiguous to
2
their territorial waters.
Such unilateral attempts to control the exploitation of the sea's resources
represent a precedent which threatens to subvert the need for international
cooperation in this vital area. This paper accordingly undertakes to suggest
methods by which bilateral or multilateral agreements might be substituted
for these unilateral declarations with an eye toward eventual international
agreement concerning the exploitation of the sea's resources.
Concern for the exploitation of the resources of the seabeds and their
superadjacent waters is by no means a recent phenomenon, but the history
of the current controversy over unilateral control of these resources beyond the limits of the territorial seas, can be traced to the issuance by the
President of the United States of a proclamation regarding the Policy of the
United States with respect to Coastal Fisheries in Certain Areas of the
High Seas. 3 The proclamation, issued in 1945, announced that the govern*J.D., Univ. of Georgia Law School (1972).
tThis paper was the winner of the 1972 Henry C. Morris International Law Contest.
1
Even the current controversy and concern over ocean dumping and the pollution of the
oceans is, at its core, directed at the preservation of the resources of the sea so that they might
be fully utilized for the benefit of mankind.
2See Heinzen, The Three-Mile Limit: Preserving the Freedom of the Seas, II STAN. L.
REv. 597, 6449 (1959) for a listing of the nations which have asserted claims over maritime
zones of 200 miles or greater.
3Exec. Proc. 2667, Sept. 28, 1945, 10 F.R. 12303.
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ment of the United States regarded itself as empowered to establish conservation zones in areas of the high seas contiguous to the coasts of the
4
United States and to regulate and control fishing activities in these zones.
Although the proclamation did not itself establish any such zones, it
prompted responses from several Latin American nations concerning their
rights in waters contiguous to their coasts. Eventually, El Salvador memorialized its claim to a territorial sea of 200 marine miles in its Political
Constitution, and Chile, Ecuador and Peru proclaimed their exclusive
sovereignty and jurisdiction over a maritime zone whose breadth was
stated as being at least 200 miles from the coasts of the respective countries. 5
The Republic of South Korea in addition claims "national sovereignty"
over a zone extending up to 200 miles from its coast. 6 Because each of
these claims appears to be based on a concern by the declarant nation for
7
the conservation of the resources of the sea in the contiguous zone, it
would be convenient to consider the declarations of Chile, Ecuador and
Peru as representative of the group and as epitomizing the problem of the
200-mile maritime zone.
The formal statement of Chile, Ecuador and Peru (the "CEP" nations)
was made in Santiago, Chile in 1952 and purported to extend the "exclusive sovereignty and jurisdiction ... over the sea that bathes the shores
of their respective countries, to a minimum distance of 200 nautical miles
from the above-mentioned coasts."" The declaration goes on to refer to this
area as a "maritime zone," and emphasizes that the nature of the jurisdiction being asserted was not intended to interfere with the recognized right
of innocent passage through these waters.9 Though the declaration speaks
of "sovereignty," it is interesting to note that it also refers to the area as a
"maritime zone" and not as territorial waters.
Moreover, a subsequent interpretation of the purposes underlying the
declaration made by a Peruvian official indicates that the aim of the exten4

5

1d.

See Heinzen, supra note 2, at 644.

6

1d.

7

See F. AMADOR, THE EXPLOITATION AND CONSERVATION OF THE RESOURCES OF THE

SEA 76-93 (1963) for a discussion of the text of the Santiago Declaration, the declaration in

which Chile, Peru and Ecuador proclaimed their sovereignty and jurisdiction over the
200-mile maritime zone. As Amador indicates, the text of the statement, and the gloss placed
on that text by subsequent statements of the delegates of the signatory nations indicates that
the sole purpose of the declaration was to secure the right to regulate the exploitation of
resources in the coastal and contiguous waters.
8
Agreement Between Chile, Peru and Ecuador, Aug. 18, 1952, Declaration on Maritime

Zones, art. 3(11), in

LAWS AND REGULATIONS ON THE REGIME OF THE TERRITORIAL SEA

724

(1957).
9

1d.
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sion of the maritime zone was solely the conservation of the resources in
the seas adjacent to Peru. 10 It appears, then, that the area claimed, at least
by the CEP nations, cannot be considered territorial waters in the traditionally understood sense." As Garcia Amador has suggested, the zone
might best be considered sui generis. 12 What is significant is that the claim
of exclusive control, whatever the label attached to it, has been asserted.
This, then, is the problem of the 200-mile limit. Equally significant, in
terms of the solution to the problem, is the fact that the concern of the
countries asserting control over the 200-mile zone appears to have been
exclusively with the natural resources of the sea. 13 The question then
becomes: Given the interest of the coastal states of the CEP group, in
regulating the exploitation of the resources of the sea in the zone contiguous to their coastline, by what methods can these nations be persuaded
to exchange their present system of unilateral control over the maritime
zone for a system of bilateral or multilateral control?
Broadly conceived, the answer to this question involves balancing the
interests of the coastal states claiming jurisdiction over the 200-mile zone
against the interests of the other nations of the world community in maintaining freedom of the seas, including freedom to fish on the high seas.
More narrowly speaking, the problem involved is the balancing of the
interests of small coastal states, many of which have no developed fishing
fleets in the modern sense, against the interests of those countries with
highly sophisticated fishing fleets capable of harvesting, processing and
canning seafood without ever having to return to a home port. Whatever
solution is posited to the problem of the 200-mile limit must provide
assurances to the small coastal states, that they will be accorded some
measure of preferential rights with respect to the marine resources in the
seas contiguous to their coastline.
Bringing about a solution to the 200-mile limit might properly be conceived as involving three phases. First, it must be decided what substantive
rights are to be accorded to the coastal state with respect to the waters
contiguous to its coastline. Second, a mechanism by means of which these
rights can be determined, on a nation-by-nation basis, in other than unilateral fashion, must be posited. Finally, a practical plan for gaining acceptance of the mechanism must be considered.
1

"Statement of Peruvian Delegate at the 486th Meeting of the Sixth Committee, Nov. 29,
1956, U.N. Doc. No. A/C 6/SR.486, at 84,86 (1956).
"One commentator has suggested that it is difficult for one to determine the exact
breadth of the territorial sea claimed by any of the three nations-Chile, Ecuador or Peru.
Heinzen,
supra note 2, at 644 n.214.
12
AMADOR, supra note 7, at 77.
"See supra. note 7.
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It must be assumed, given the current status of international affairs
that the coastal state is entitled to some superiority of rights with respect to
the exploitation of the resources in the seas contiguous to its coastline.
Unilateral declarations regarding these preferential rights have been made
over the years and have been accepted, willingly or otherwise, by the
members of the international community. 14 Moreover, the Rome Convention of 1955 had recognized the notion that the coastal state had special
interests in the contiguous waters, virtually without debate. 15 The question,
then becomes: What is the nature of these rights and to what extent do
they extend?
Basically, a coastal state could be accorded rights either over a specific
territory in its contiguous waters, or over specific types of resources to be
found in those waters. Given that the primary interest of the states claiming the 200-mile limit is evidently in the resources of their adjacent waters,
it would seem, without more, that the preferred method would be to define
the rights of the coastal state in terms of specific species of fish or other
marine fauna. Ideally, such a scheme, if extended to include all the species
of fauna in the sea, would allow a balancing of the interests of the coastal
state in the fauna in its contiguous waters, against the needs of the greater
world community without resort to extensive claims of sovereign jurisdiction.
Practically speaking, however, it must be conceded that the extent of
man's knowledge concerning the abundance and habits of marine fauna,
render such a scheme unworkable at the present time.' 6 What might be
possible, given the current level of knowledge, would be bilateral or multilateral agreements between the coastal state and other states, concerning
the extent to which certain species of marine fauna will be exploited in the
seas contiguous to the coastal state. In essence, the coastal state would be
granted the privilege of asserting a special interest in certain resources
found in the waters contiguous to its coastline.
The question then arises: To what distance should the coastal state be
allowed to assert its special competence? Past attempts to define limits of
competence in the waters contiguous to a coastal state have emphasized
arbitrary limits expressed in terms of nautical miles.' 7 The most popular of
14

Two examples are the proclamation by the President of the United States, supra note
3, and the Santiago Declaration, supra note 8.
15
AMADOR, supra note 7 at 155.
16
While it is indisputable that the range of man's knowledge concerning marine life is
rapidly expanding, recent revelations in estimates of the world tuna population suggest that
this knowledge is by no means complete. See T. WOLFF, PERUVIAN-UNITED STATES RELATIONS OVER MARITIME FISHING: 1945- 1969 (1970) at 22.
17See INTER-AMERICAN JURIDICIAL COMMITTEE, OPINION ON THE BREADTH OF THE
TERRITORIAL SEA (1966), for a historical discussion of attempts to fix a limit to the extent to

which a state could claim territorial waters.
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these schemes would establish a limit of twelve miles, to be apportioned
between territorial waters and contiguous zone."'
The shortcoming of such an approach is that it fails to account for the
peculiar characteristics of the ecosystem upon which the species essential
to the welfare of the coastal state depends. For example, the 200-mile limit
claimed by the CEP nations is purportedly based on scientific data indicating that such an extent of protection is necessary to prevent destruction of the ecosystem upon which the economy of the coastal states is
partially dependant.' 9 Accordingly, the limits to which the coastal state
should be allowed to assert a special interest should be related to the
nature of the interest to be protected, and not based on some arbitrary
notion of limits to be applied uniformly to all countries.
In summary, then, the substantive rights of the coastal state to the
resources in the contiguous waters, should be expressed in terms of a
special interest of the coastal state in the conservation and use of the
resources in the waters contiguous to its coasts. The range over which the
coastal state should be permitted to claim its special interest should be
determined with respect to the nature of the interest to be protected. It
should be noted that these suggestions are compatible with the nature of
the interest asserted by the CEP nations, as indicated by the Santiago
Declaration and subsequent clarifying statements made with respect to that
20
declaration.
The crux of the matter concerning the 200-mile limit-and the point on
which there seems to be the most vehement controversy-is the way in
which the special interest of the coastal state is to be balanced against the
interests of other nations, in the free use of the high seas for resource
exploitation. This raises the second question of the phases that must
underlie the solution to the problem of the 200-mile limit: By what mechanism are the rights of the coastal state with respect to the resources of the
contiguous sea to be determined?
The most obnoxious aspect of the declaration of sovereignty and jurisdiction over the 200-mile maritime zone by the CEP nations, is the manner
in which that sovereignty and jurisdiction is exercised: unilaterally. The
CEP nations have not attempted to negotiate with other states which have
been in the past, or are currently, interested in fishing the waters within the
limits of the 200-mile zone to determine the extent to which the resources
in that area will be exploited.
Rather, the CEP nations have established themselves as sole licensing
8

1 1d. at 91.
19

7, at 75-6.
See supra notes 8 and 10 and accompanying text.

AMADOR, supra note
20
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agents for fishing rights in the zone; any nation desiring to fish in the zone
must do so at the pleasure of the coastal state and at the price unilaterally
fixed by the coastal state; otherwise, he fishes at his own risk. What is
needed is an alternative method or mechanism for determining the extent
to which the coastal state can assert its control over the contiguous sea-a
method that involves consultation and mutual agreement among all involved parties.
Alternative methods for arriving at such a non-unilateral approach to the
determination and denomination of special interests in the contiguous zone
might include: (1) bilateral agreements between the coastal state and other
states wishing to exploit resources in the contiguous sea; (2) multilateral or
regional agreements concerning the exploitation of resources in a given
territory, and involving all of the nations interested in exploiting those
resources; (3) international conventions regarding the exploitation of resources on a worldwide basis; and (4) the establishment of an
ocean-r~gime 2 ' or govenment to determine the ways in which the resources
of the sea are to be exploited and allocated among the various nations of
the world.
From the standpoint of encouraging a rule of law governing the use of
the ocean resources, the adoption of an international convention or the
establishment of an ocean-regime would be the preferable approach. Although an ocean-regime statute has been suggested, one has not been
considered for implementation on an international scale. 22 Moreover, the
approach by international conventions has been unsuccessful with respect
to any agreement concerning the method by which ocean resources are to
be exploited.2 3 Significantly, the Cuban-Mexican draft proposal for an
international convention, submitted at the Rome Conference of 1955 and
defeated there on procedural grounds, proposed a method for controlling
the exploitation of ocean resources and received the support of the CEP
24
nations.
It is unfortunate that the subsequent Geneva Conferences of 1956 and
1960 deadlocked on the question of the breadth of the territorial sea, and
made no significant progress toward reaching agreement on the use of
ocean resources, a matter whose settlement must precede any hoped-for
agreement on the breadth of the territorial sea. In any event, most commentators seem to be of the opinion that the experiences at Geneva in
1956, lessened rather than increased the chances for international agree21

See E. BORGESE, THE OCEAN REGIME (1970) for a discussion of proposals for the
creation
of such a government of the sea.
22
1d.
See INTER-AMERICAN JURIDICIAL COMMITTEE, supra note 17.
24
23

For a discussion of the Cuban- Mexican draft, see AMADOR, supra note 7, at 15 1- 57.
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ment concerning the extent of coastal-state competence to assert special
25
interests in the contiguous sea.
The most fertile ground for agreement, therefore, would seem to be at
the level of bilateral or multilateral-regional agreements concerning the
exploitation of the resources of the sea, especially in the areas over which
the CEP nations currently assert sovereignty and jurisdiction. Such agreement might be based on the Cuban-Mexican draft proposal from the Rome
Conference of 1955 and be adapted for use on a regional basis rather than
an international one. Indeed, in all matters save those of dispute settlement, the Cuban- Mexican draft purported to rest on regional settlement
of questions concerning resource allocation.
Specifically, the draft proposed: That conservation measures be regional in character; that the measures relate to species of marine fauna rather
than to territories of the sea; that the coastal state be empowered to take
unilateral action with respect to marine fauna if such action was based on
scientific and technical data indicating that the limitation of exploitation of
the fauna was necessary to the economic and social welfare of the coastal
state, and, if such action did not discriminate against foreign fishermen;
and, finally, that disputes concerning the exploitation of resources be set26
tled by an international body.
To the end of implementing such a plan, a conference could be called to
include all nations which are now or plan to be fishing in the waters
affected by the declarations of the CEP nations, and in the other waters of
27
the South Pacific off the coast of South America.
Such a conference might address itself to the problem of securing adequate scientific and technical data concerning the marine fauna found in
this regional area; such a study, endorsed by all of the members would be
an important pre-requisite to the consideration of claims of special competence by coastal states over species of marine fauna. In addition, the
conference could formulate principles, similar to those contained in the
Cuban-Mexican draft, to govern the maritime activities of the member
nations in the region; based on these principles, consideration could then
be directed to existing practices by coastal states in. the region, and a
regional council could be established to adjudicate disputes over claims of
right by coastal states. This, then, would provide a mechanism for the
handling of resource allocation in the seas contiguous to coastal states.
25

26

M.McDoUGAL & W. BURKE, THE PUBLIC ORDER OF THE OCEANS 14 (1962).

See AMADOR, supra note 7, at 151-52.
27
The history of attempts to convene such a conference and the current appraisal of
prospects for agreement on principle between the CEP nations and other interested parties are
detailed in WOLFF, supra note 16, at 13-20.
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Coupled with an approach to the substantive issues of the type outlined
earlier, such a mechanism should logically satisfy the needs of the coastal
state to protect the marine fauna in the contiguous sea from overexploitation and, at the same time, by means of the non-discrimination
provision, strike a balance between the interests of the coastal state and
other maritime nations. Moreover, the non-discrimination provision
coupled with the right of any state to appeal actions by the coastal state to
a regional body, would eliminate the offensively unilateral character of the
rights currently asserted over the maritime zone by the CEP nations,
without calling for a direct confrontation with those nations over the nature
of their declaration of interest.
The question then remains: What are the realistic chances of success for
such an approach? Procedurally, there would seem to be no reason why
such a conference could not be convened within a short period of time.
Substantively, the major stumbling block to such an agreement might be
the willingness of the maritime powers to concede the rights of small,
non-maritime states to impose limitations on the extent to which the resources of the sea are to be harvested.
Politically speaking, however, the small nations, such as the CEP nations, must be handled gingerly on the subject of resource exploitation.
These countries, many of them feeling that their land based resources have
already been over-exploited by the incursions of the large industrial nations
of the world, are doubtless going to be sensitive to the question of the
extent to which the resources in the contiguous sea are to be exploited in
28
similar fashion.
Accordingly, the maritime powers should be prepared to make concessions, for example, with regard to the composition of the disputesettling tribunal to assure the smaller nations that the purpose of a regional
agreement concerning the exploitation of the resources of the sea, is not
merely a device for imposing their own views about the exploitation of
these resources on the less powerful nations. If the suspicions of the CEP
nations can be overcome, there would seem to be no practical barriers to
the establishment of a regional convention governing the exploitation of the
resources of the South Pacific. And such an agreement should provide a
precedent for the solution of the problem of the 200-mile limit elsewhere.
In summary, then, the problem of the 200-mile territorial limit is at heart
a problem concerning the allocation of the resources of the oceans. Any
2

8
Recent developments in Chile regarding the nationalization of foreign industries, lend
support to the proposition that the psychology of the Latin American countries with respect to
foreign exploitation, is of paramount significance for the settlement of disputes over resource-exploitation in the contiguous seas.
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attempt to solve the problem of the 200-mile claim by the CEP nations and
others must address itself to the question of resource allocation. Substantively, the special interests of the coastal state in the resources of the
contiguous sea must be recognized, and must be allowed to the extent that
scientific and technical information indicate that such claims are justified.
Procedurally, however, the coastal state cannot be allowed to establish
itself as a unilateral regulatory agent for the exploitation of resources in the
contiguous sea in a manner that discriminates against other maritime nations.
Accordingly, a regional agreement based on the Cuban-Mexican draft
presented to the Rome Conference, should be adopted as the mechanism
for regulating resource allocation in the areas currently affected by the
assertion of the 200-mile limit. The adoption of such an agreement would
provide the solution to the current controversy over that limit and would
lay the foundation for eventual international agreement on the exploitation
of marine resources according to a rule of law.
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